net.ihe.gazelle.assets.SearchCriteria : 23 assertions found for this search Review filtered assertions

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ATNAATNA-1Testable 1 4 I think this is redundant to ATNA-11. This is just a generic statement about the ITI-19 transaction. > No, the use of bi-directionnal certificate authentication is implicit in ITI19-1, this assertion makes it explicit.The Audit Trail and Node Authentication Integration Profile requires the use of bi-directional certificate-based node authentication for connections to and from each node.72Section 9.48/26/19 5:25:26 PM by ceoche
ATNAATNA-11Testable 2 2 Are we going to duplicate the assertions for SN or SA, or just link these assertions to both actors. I think we should link to both.Secure Node actor which claims support for the Audit Trail and Node Authentication (ATNA) integration profile shall support the Authentication Node [ITI-19] transaction69Table 9.1-17/11/19 7:28:57 PM by ceoche
ATNAATNA-14Testable 2 2 I disagree with this assertion. Section 9.7 reads "If the product claims only to include the Secure Application Actor, that indicates that only those security features that apply to the application features are provided by the product." I expect SAs to support ITI-19 for its IHE transactions that carry PHI. > Yes, this is the philosophy of the SA actor in the TF : "required only for transactions containing PHI". According to 2nd Review group, the TF is the reference, so we won't delete this assertion.Secure Application actor which claims support for the Audit Trail and Node Authentication (ATNA) integration profile may perform the Authentication Node [ITI-19] transaction69Table 9.1-18/26/19 5:25:26 PM by ceoche
ATNAATNA-17Testable 1 2 The Secure Node Actor shall include the Authenticate Node [ITI-19] transaction for all network connections that may expose private information. 69Table 9.1-18/26/19 5:25:26 PM by ceoche
ATNAATNA-18Testable 3 2 The Secure Node Actor shall ensure all local user activity (login, logout, etc.) protected to ensure only authorized users. 69Section 9.1.1.18/26/19 5:25:26 PM by ceoche
ATNAATNA-19Testable 1 2 I think this is redundant with assertion ATNA-12The Secure Node Actor shall include the record Audit Event as specified in ITI TF-2a: 3.2069Section 9.1.1.17/11/19 7:02:45 PM by ceoche
ATNAATNA-2Testable 1 3 probably not a testable assertionSecure Nodes shall either prohibit, or be designed and verified to prevent access to PHI, whenever connections are not bi-directionally node-authenticated .69Section 9.1.18/26/19 5:25:26 PM by ceoche
ATNAATNA-9Testable 2 2 When an implementation chooses to support this Integration Profile for an actor, non-IHE applications that process PHI shall detect and report auditable events, and protect access.72Section 9.47/11/19 7:25:04 PM by ceoche
CH-ATNACH-ATNA-005validatedTestable 1 1 In audit records generated by IHE and EPR actors, the OID of the audit source MUST be specified in AuditSourceIdentification/@AuditEnterpriseSiteID attribute16Section 1.58/26/19 5:25:26 PM by ceoche
CH-ATNACH-ATNA-007validatedTestable 1 1 For audit records generated by IHE and EPR actors, In the "AuditMessage/ParticipantObjectIdentification" node, for the value of the "@ParticipantObjectSensitivity" field, the current confidentiality code of the object MUST be specified IF KNOWN when the object is a document in the EPR. This value MUST represent a value from the Swiss Metadata Value Set, the attribute @codeSystemName (2.16.756.5.30.1.127.3.10.6). The following sequences are required OID as the code system name, e.g 1051000195109^normal^2.16.840.1.113883.6.9616Section 1.57/11/19 7:15:52 PM by ceoche
ITI19ITI19-1reviewedTestable 2 0 When Authenticating the Remote Secure Node, the Local Secure Node shall be able to perform certificate validation based on signature by a trusted CA.133Section 3.19.6.18/26/19 5:25:26 PM by ceoche
ITI19ITI19-11reviewedTestable 1 0 The certificates used for mutual authentication shall be X509 certificates based on RSA key with key length in the range of 1024-4096.134Section 3.19.6.1.37/11/19 7:33:08 PM by ceoche
ITI19ITI19-14reviewedTestable 1 0 For all connections carrying Protected Information (PI) and when configured for use not on a physically secured network, implementations shall use the TLS protocol.135Section 3.19.6.28/26/19 5:25:26 PM by ceoche
ITI19ITI19-15reviewedTestable 1 0 For all connections carrying Protected Information (PI) and when configured for use not on a physically secured network, implementations shall support TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ciphersuite.135Section 3.19.6.28/26/19 5:25:26 PM by ceoche
ITI19ITI19-2reviewedTestable 1 0 When Authenticating the Remote Secure Node, the Local Secure Node shall be able to perform direct certificate validation to a set of trusted certificates.133Section 3.19.6.18/26/19 5:25:26 PM by ceoche
ITI19ITI19-3reviewedTestable 1 0 The Secure Node or Secure Application shall provide the means for configuring which CAs are trusted to authenticate node certificates for use in a chain of trust. These CAs shall be identified by means of the public signing certificate for the signing CA.134Section 3.19.6.1.18/26/19 5:25:26 PM by ceoche
ITI19ITI19-32reviewedTestable 1 0 The Secure Node starts the local authentication process with a User when the User wants to log on to the node.136Section 3.19.77/11/19 7:39:16 PM by ceoche
ITI19ITI19-33reviewedTestable 1 0 The secure node shall not allow access to PHI to an operator who has not successfully completed the local user authentication.136Section 3.19.77/11/19 7:39:24 PM by ceoche
ITI19ITI19-34reviewedTestable 1 0 The User shall log in using his or her own unique individually assigned identity.136Section 3.19.77/11/19 7:39:31 PM by ceoche
ITI19ITI19-9reviewedTestable 1 0 The Secure Node or Secure Application shall not require any specific certificate attribute contents.134Section 3.19.6.1.34/30/19 4:50:25 PM by NicolasBailliet